Question for you nuc types ..
03-12-2011, 12:34 PM
#16
It's my pot and I'll stir it if I want to. If you're not careful, I'll stir your's as well!
Thread Starter
Just read that the plant is now producing in one hour, radiation equivalent to one year.
03-12-2011, 05:00 PM
#17
Registered User
Just read they have a partial core meltdown and they are dumping as mush sea water as possible trying to keep it from going Chernobyl.
03-12-2011, 11:19 PM
#21
DTR's Locomotive Superhero and the DTR Sweet Tea Specialist
03-13-2011, 11:10 AM
#22
Registered User
Well, if anyone will survive it they will. They have the courage and unfortunately the experience.
03-13-2011, 11:24 AM
#23
Muted one day, Banned the next....... Ah the life of a DTR 1%'er
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03-14-2011, 08:40 AM
#24
Administrator
Just looked at Reuters, looks like the fuel is still in the core which is a good thing. A lot of info here if this link will work for you.
http://www.nei.org/
http://www.nei.org/
03-14-2011, 09:54 AM
#25
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The SG's, standby generators, did come on initially, to provide power for the coolent injection. But that was after the quake and before the Tsunami.
The explosion seen on the news coverage is thought to be from a hydrogen bubble, a by-product of the overheating core causing pressure inside the containent building.
03-14-2011, 10:13 AM
#26
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^^^^^ How could it not be a threat to the public with radiation levels emitted in 1 hour equivilant to that in 1 year?
03-14-2011, 10:24 AM
#27
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Example, Water intakes on Lake Ontario monitor for radiation, typically 1 X 10-7. A news story reported an increase of 300 %!
3 X 10-7 is a 300 % increase, but it's still 0.0000003 rads.
03-14-2011, 10:35 AM
#28
Administrator
American Nuclear Society Backgrounder:
Japanese Earthquake/Tsunami; Problems with Nuclear Reactors
3/12/2011 5:22 PM EST
To begin, a sense of perspective is needed right now, the Japanese earthquake/tsunami is clearly a catastrophe; the situation at impacted nuclear reactors is, in the words of IAEA, an "Accident with Local Consequences."
The Japanese earthquake and tsunami are natural catastrophes of historic proportions. The death toll is likely to be in the thousands. While the information is still not complete at this time, the tragic loss of life and destruction caused by the earthquake and tsunami will likely dwarf the damage caused by the problems associated with the impacted Japanese nuclear plants.
What happened?
Recognizing that information is still not complete due to the destruction of the communication infrastructure, producing reports that are conflicting, here is our best understanding of the sequence of events at the Fukushima I‐1 power station.
The plant was immediately shut down (scrammed) when the earthquake first hit. The automatic power system worked.
All external power to the station was lost when the sea water swept away the power lines.
Diesel generators started to provide backup electrical power to the plants backup cooling system. The backup worked.
The diesel generators ceased functioning after approximately one hour due to tsunami induced damage, reportedly to their fuel supply.
An Isolation condenser was used to remove the decay heat from the shutdown reactor.
Apparently the plant then experienced a small loss of coolant from the reactor.
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) pumps, which operate on steam from the reactor, were used to replace reactor core water inventory, however, the battery‐supplied control valves lost DC power after the prolonged use.
DC power from batteries was consumed after approximately 8 hours.
At that point, the plant experienced a complete blackout (no electric power at all).
Hours passed as primary water inventory was lost and core degradation occurred (through some combination of zirconium oxidation and clad failure).
Portable diesel generators were delivered to the plant site.
AC power was restored allowing for a different backup pumping system to replace inventory in reactor pressure vessel (RPV).
Pressure in the containment drywell rose as wetwell became hotter.
The Drywell containment was vented to outside reactor building which surrounds the containment.
Hydrogen produced from zirconium oxidation was vented from the containment into the reactor building.
Hydrogen in reactor building exploded causing it to collapse around the containment.
The containment around the reactor and RPV were reported to be intact.
The decision was made to inject seawater into the RPV to continue to the cooling process, another backup system that was designed into the plant from inception.
Radioactivity releases from operator initiated venting appear to be decreasing.
Can it happen here in the US ?
While there are risks associated with operating nuclear plants and other industrial facilities, the chances of an adverse event similar to what happened in Japan occurring in the US is small.
Since September 11, 2001, additional safeguards and training have been put in place at US nuclear reactors which allow plant operators to cool the reactor core during an extended power outage and/or failure of backup generators blackout conditions.
Is a nuclear reactor "meltdown" a catastrophic event?
Not necessarily. Nuclear reactors are built with redundant safety systems. Even if the fuel in the reactor melts, the reactor's containment systems are designed to prevent the spread of radioactivity into the environment. Should an event like this occur, containing the radioactive materials could actually be considered a "success" given the scale of this natural disaster that had not been considered in the original design. The nuclear power industry will learn from this event, and redesign our facilities as needed to make them safer in the future.
What is the ANS doing?
ANS has reached out to The Atomic Energy Society of Japan (AESJ) to offer technical assistance.
ANS has established an incident communications response team.
This team has compiling relevant news reports and other publicly available information on the ANS blog, which can be found at ansnuclearcafe.org.
The team is also fielding media inquiries and providing reporters with background information and technical perspective as the events unfold.
Finally, the ANS is collecting information from publicly available sources, our sources in government agencies, and our sources on the ground in Japan , to better understand the extent and impact of the incident.
Japanese Earthquake/Tsunami; Problems with Nuclear Reactors
3/12/2011 5:22 PM EST
To begin, a sense of perspective is needed right now, the Japanese earthquake/tsunami is clearly a catastrophe; the situation at impacted nuclear reactors is, in the words of IAEA, an "Accident with Local Consequences."
The Japanese earthquake and tsunami are natural catastrophes of historic proportions. The death toll is likely to be in the thousands. While the information is still not complete at this time, the tragic loss of life and destruction caused by the earthquake and tsunami will likely dwarf the damage caused by the problems associated with the impacted Japanese nuclear plants.
What happened?
Recognizing that information is still not complete due to the destruction of the communication infrastructure, producing reports that are conflicting, here is our best understanding of the sequence of events at the Fukushima I‐1 power station.
The plant was immediately shut down (scrammed) when the earthquake first hit. The automatic power system worked.
All external power to the station was lost when the sea water swept away the power lines.
Diesel generators started to provide backup electrical power to the plants backup cooling system. The backup worked.
The diesel generators ceased functioning after approximately one hour due to tsunami induced damage, reportedly to their fuel supply.
An Isolation condenser was used to remove the decay heat from the shutdown reactor.
Apparently the plant then experienced a small loss of coolant from the reactor.
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) pumps, which operate on steam from the reactor, were used to replace reactor core water inventory, however, the battery‐supplied control valves lost DC power after the prolonged use.
DC power from batteries was consumed after approximately 8 hours.
At that point, the plant experienced a complete blackout (no electric power at all).
Hours passed as primary water inventory was lost and core degradation occurred (through some combination of zirconium oxidation and clad failure).
Portable diesel generators were delivered to the plant site.
AC power was restored allowing for a different backup pumping system to replace inventory in reactor pressure vessel (RPV).
Pressure in the containment drywell rose as wetwell became hotter.
The Drywell containment was vented to outside reactor building which surrounds the containment.
Hydrogen produced from zirconium oxidation was vented from the containment into the reactor building.
Hydrogen in reactor building exploded causing it to collapse around the containment.
The containment around the reactor and RPV were reported to be intact.
The decision was made to inject seawater into the RPV to continue to the cooling process, another backup system that was designed into the plant from inception.
Radioactivity releases from operator initiated venting appear to be decreasing.
Can it happen here in the US ?
While there are risks associated with operating nuclear plants and other industrial facilities, the chances of an adverse event similar to what happened in Japan occurring in the US is small.
Since September 11, 2001, additional safeguards and training have been put in place at US nuclear reactors which allow plant operators to cool the reactor core during an extended power outage and/or failure of backup generators blackout conditions.
Is a nuclear reactor "meltdown" a catastrophic event?
Not necessarily. Nuclear reactors are built with redundant safety systems. Even if the fuel in the reactor melts, the reactor's containment systems are designed to prevent the spread of radioactivity into the environment. Should an event like this occur, containing the radioactive materials could actually be considered a "success" given the scale of this natural disaster that had not been considered in the original design. The nuclear power industry will learn from this event, and redesign our facilities as needed to make them safer in the future.
What is the ANS doing?
ANS has reached out to The Atomic Energy Society of Japan (AESJ) to offer technical assistance.
ANS has established an incident communications response team.
This team has compiling relevant news reports and other publicly available information on the ANS blog, which can be found at ansnuclearcafe.org.
The team is also fielding media inquiries and providing reporters with background information and technical perspective as the events unfold.
Finally, the ANS is collecting information from publicly available sources, our sources in government agencies, and our sources on the ground in Japan , to better understand the extent and impact of the incident.
03-14-2011, 11:12 AM
#29
Administrator
UPDATE AS OF 11:00 A.M. EDT, MONDAY, MARCH 14:
Fuel rods in the reactor vessel of Unit 2 at the Fukushima Daiichi Power Plant were temporarily uncovered from cooling water today, but seawater injection has raised the water level to the halfway point, Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) said. Seawater is now being used to cool all three Daiichi reactors that were shut down after the March 11 earthquake. Unit 2 had lost its emergency cooling capacity. Workers were preparing to remove hydrogen from the reactor building, and TEPCO has opened the steam relief valve of the reactor.
The primary containment vessels and reactor cores of reactors 1 and 3 at the Fukushima Daiichi facility are intact, following earlier hydrogen explosions in the secondary containment buildings of both reactors.
At Unit 1, seawater injection continues to cool reactor. Safety regulators consider the reactors pressure an indication of a stable condition. The hydrogen explosion on March 11, which occurred between the primary containment vessel and the containment building, did not damage the primary containment vessel or the reactor core. To control the pressure of the reactor core, TEPCO has been injecting seawater and boric acid into the primary containment vessel of Unit 1 since March 12.
A hydrogen explosion Monday at Unit 3, similar to the unit 1 explosion, did not damage the primary containment, Japans Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) said. The control room remains operational, and a government official said that pressure in the reactor vessel is stable. After the explosion, the few hundred people remaining in the 12.5-mile evacuation zone were asked to stay indoors.
At the Fukushima Daini site, cooling capability has been reestablished for Unit 4 at the reactor. Units 2 and 4 are in cold shutdown.
Fuel rods in the reactor vessel of Unit 2 at the Fukushima Daiichi Power Plant were temporarily uncovered from cooling water today, but seawater injection has raised the water level to the halfway point, Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) said. Seawater is now being used to cool all three Daiichi reactors that were shut down after the March 11 earthquake. Unit 2 had lost its emergency cooling capacity. Workers were preparing to remove hydrogen from the reactor building, and TEPCO has opened the steam relief valve of the reactor.
The primary containment vessels and reactor cores of reactors 1 and 3 at the Fukushima Daiichi facility are intact, following earlier hydrogen explosions in the secondary containment buildings of both reactors.
At Unit 1, seawater injection continues to cool reactor. Safety regulators consider the reactors pressure an indication of a stable condition. The hydrogen explosion on March 11, which occurred between the primary containment vessel and the containment building, did not damage the primary containment vessel or the reactor core. To control the pressure of the reactor core, TEPCO has been injecting seawater and boric acid into the primary containment vessel of Unit 1 since March 12.
A hydrogen explosion Monday at Unit 3, similar to the unit 1 explosion, did not damage the primary containment, Japans Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) said. The control room remains operational, and a government official said that pressure in the reactor vessel is stable. After the explosion, the few hundred people remaining in the 12.5-mile evacuation zone were asked to stay indoors.
At the Fukushima Daini site, cooling capability has been reestablished for Unit 4 at the reactor. Units 2 and 4 are in cold shutdown.
03-14-2011, 11:16 AM
#30
It's my pot and I'll stir it if I want to. If you're not careful, I'll stir your's as well!
Thread Starter
Do not mention Chernobyl in the same sentence with anything to do with Japan! Chernobyl's accicident was instantanious, completely different design, the Japanese reactors, all of them, are already shutdown. Cooling the core is the only concern now. A meltdown is likely unavoidable but not a threat to the public.
The SG's, standby generators, did come on initially, to provide power for the coolent injection. But that was after the quake and before the Tsunami.
The explosion seen on the news coverage is thought to be from a hydrogen bubble, a by-product of the overheating core causing pressure inside the containent building.
The SG's, standby generators, did come on initially, to provide power for the coolent injection. But that was after the quake and before the Tsunami.
The explosion seen on the news coverage is thought to be from a hydrogen bubble, a by-product of the overheating core causing pressure inside the containent building.
Don't believe everything in print. Radiation levels are normally too small to mention. Airline pilots recieve more dose than most nuclear workers.
Example, Water intakes on Lake Ontario monitor for radiation, typically 1 X 10-7. A news story reported an increase of 300 %!
3 X 10-7 is a 300 % increase, but it's still 0.0000003 rads.
Example, Water intakes on Lake Ontario monitor for radiation, typically 1 X 10-7. A news story reported an increase of 300 %!
3 X 10-7 is a 300 % increase, but it's still 0.0000003 rads.
American Nuclear Society Backgrounder:
Japanese Earthquake/Tsunami; Problems with Nuclear Reactors
3/12/2011 5:22 PM EST
To begin, a sense of perspective is needed right now, the Japanese earthquake/tsunami is clearly a catastrophe; the situation at impacted nuclear reactors is, in the words of IAEA, an "Accident with Local Consequences."
The Japanese earthquake and tsunami are natural catastrophes of historic proportions. The death toll is likely to be in the thousands. While the information is still not complete at this time, the tragic loss of life and destruction caused by the earthquake and tsunami will likely dwarf the damage caused by the problems associated with the impacted Japanese nuclear plants.
What happened?
Recognizing that information is still not complete due to the destruction of the communication infrastructure, producing reports that are conflicting, here is our best understanding of the sequence of events at the Fukushima I‐1 power station.
The plant was immediately shut down (scrammed) when the earthquake first hit. The automatic power system worked.
All external power to the station was lost when the sea water swept away the power lines.
Diesel generators started to provide backup electrical power to the plants backup cooling system. The backup worked.
The diesel generators ceased functioning after approximately one hour due to tsunami induced damage, reportedly to their fuel supply.
An Isolation condenser was used to remove the decay heat from the shutdown reactor.
Apparently the plant then experienced a small loss of coolant from the reactor.
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) pumps, which operate on steam from the reactor, were used to replace reactor core water inventory, however, the battery‐supplied control valves lost DC power after the prolonged use.
DC power from batteries was consumed after approximately 8 hours.
At that point, the plant experienced a complete blackout (no electric power at all).
Hours passed as primary water inventory was lost and core degradation occurred (through some combination of zirconium oxidation and clad failure).
Portable diesel generators were delivered to the plant site.
AC power was restored allowing for a different backup pumping system to replace inventory in reactor pressure vessel (RPV).
Pressure in the containment drywell rose as wetwell became hotter.
The Drywell containment was vented to outside reactor building which surrounds the containment.
Hydrogen produced from zirconium oxidation was vented from the containment into the reactor building.
Hydrogen in reactor building exploded causing it to collapse around the containment.
The containment around the reactor and RPV were reported to be intact.
The decision was made to inject seawater into the RPV to continue to the cooling process, another backup system that was designed into the plant from inception.
Radioactivity releases from operator initiated venting appear to be decreasing.
Can it happen here in the US ?
While there are risks associated with operating nuclear plants and other industrial facilities, the chances of an adverse event similar to what happened in Japan occurring in the US is small.
Since September 11, 2001, additional safeguards and training have been put in place at US nuclear reactors which allow plant operators to cool the reactor core during an extended power outage and/or failure of backup generators blackout conditions.
Is a nuclear reactor "meltdown" a catastrophic event?
Not necessarily. Nuclear reactors are built with redundant safety systems. Even if the fuel in the reactor melts, the reactor's containment systems are designed to prevent the spread of radioactivity into the environment. Should an event like this occur, containing the radioactive materials could actually be considered a "success" given the scale of this natural disaster that had not been considered in the original design. The nuclear power industry will learn from this event, and redesign our facilities as needed to make them safer in the future.
What is the ANS doing?
ANS has reached out to The Atomic Energy Society of Japan (AESJ) to offer technical assistance.
ANS has established an incident communications response team.
This team has compiling relevant news reports and other publicly available information on the ANS blog, which can be found at ansnuclearcafe.org.
The team is also fielding media inquiries and providing reporters with background information and technical perspective as the events unfold.
Finally, the ANS is collecting information from publicly available sources, our sources in government agencies, and our sources on the ground in Japan , to better understand the extent and impact of the incident.
Japanese Earthquake/Tsunami; Problems with Nuclear Reactors
3/12/2011 5:22 PM EST
To begin, a sense of perspective is needed right now, the Japanese earthquake/tsunami is clearly a catastrophe; the situation at impacted nuclear reactors is, in the words of IAEA, an "Accident with Local Consequences."
The Japanese earthquake and tsunami are natural catastrophes of historic proportions. The death toll is likely to be in the thousands. While the information is still not complete at this time, the tragic loss of life and destruction caused by the earthquake and tsunami will likely dwarf the damage caused by the problems associated with the impacted Japanese nuclear plants.
What happened?
Recognizing that information is still not complete due to the destruction of the communication infrastructure, producing reports that are conflicting, here is our best understanding of the sequence of events at the Fukushima I‐1 power station.
The plant was immediately shut down (scrammed) when the earthquake first hit. The automatic power system worked.
All external power to the station was lost when the sea water swept away the power lines.
Diesel generators started to provide backup electrical power to the plants backup cooling system. The backup worked.
The diesel generators ceased functioning after approximately one hour due to tsunami induced damage, reportedly to their fuel supply.
An Isolation condenser was used to remove the decay heat from the shutdown reactor.
Apparently the plant then experienced a small loss of coolant from the reactor.
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) pumps, which operate on steam from the reactor, were used to replace reactor core water inventory, however, the battery‐supplied control valves lost DC power after the prolonged use.
DC power from batteries was consumed after approximately 8 hours.
At that point, the plant experienced a complete blackout (no electric power at all).
Hours passed as primary water inventory was lost and core degradation occurred (through some combination of zirconium oxidation and clad failure).
Portable diesel generators were delivered to the plant site.
AC power was restored allowing for a different backup pumping system to replace inventory in reactor pressure vessel (RPV).
Pressure in the containment drywell rose as wetwell became hotter.
The Drywell containment was vented to outside reactor building which surrounds the containment.
Hydrogen produced from zirconium oxidation was vented from the containment into the reactor building.
Hydrogen in reactor building exploded causing it to collapse around the containment.
The containment around the reactor and RPV were reported to be intact.
The decision was made to inject seawater into the RPV to continue to the cooling process, another backup system that was designed into the plant from inception.
Radioactivity releases from operator initiated venting appear to be decreasing.
Can it happen here in the US ?
While there are risks associated with operating nuclear plants and other industrial facilities, the chances of an adverse event similar to what happened in Japan occurring in the US is small.
Since September 11, 2001, additional safeguards and training have been put in place at US nuclear reactors which allow plant operators to cool the reactor core during an extended power outage and/or failure of backup generators blackout conditions.
Is a nuclear reactor "meltdown" a catastrophic event?
Not necessarily. Nuclear reactors are built with redundant safety systems. Even if the fuel in the reactor melts, the reactor's containment systems are designed to prevent the spread of radioactivity into the environment. Should an event like this occur, containing the radioactive materials could actually be considered a "success" given the scale of this natural disaster that had not been considered in the original design. The nuclear power industry will learn from this event, and redesign our facilities as needed to make them safer in the future.
What is the ANS doing?
ANS has reached out to The Atomic Energy Society of Japan (AESJ) to offer technical assistance.
ANS has established an incident communications response team.
This team has compiling relevant news reports and other publicly available information on the ANS blog, which can be found at ansnuclearcafe.org.
The team is also fielding media inquiries and providing reporters with background information and technical perspective as the events unfold.
Finally, the ANS is collecting information from publicly available sources, our sources in government agencies, and our sources on the ground in Japan , to better understand the extent and impact of the incident.
Dieseldude4x4, nice summary, thanks.